Machines, Brains, and Consciousness

Timo Jarvilehto
Department of Behavioral Sciences, University of Oulu
 
 

The machine as an organism-environment system

What is a machine and what is its relation to its constructor, the human being?  Is a machine only the set of elements that we put together and let then work in some environment? When we build a machine, what do we build, exactly?

In fact, when we build a car, for example, we must simultaneously construct its environment, in the form of roads, bridges etc. We must also train its driver. A car without the possibility of driving from one place to another is not really a car, but a cottage, for example. Thus, the construction of the specific action environment is an essential part of the building process of the machine, and at least as important as the construction of its "inner" parts. Of course, this is often not so striking, because the action environment of the machine usually already exists before the planning of the construction is started. However, the planner knows (and must know) this environment, and it is precisely he (and later the user) who connects the machine with its environment.  Thus, a functioning machine is an "organism-environment" system that consists of the machine, its environment and its planner/user.

From the point of view of the organism-environment theory (Jarvilehto, 1998), the environment of the machine is a human environment as it is presented in language. In the construction of machines, we explicitly separate machine and environment and use language in the description of the parts of the machine and the parts of the environment which are related to it. It is the planner or constructor who thinks what will happen with a certain set of elements in an environment that HE knows. However,  it is well possible that for the machine such features of the world exist which are not (and even cannot be) parts of the environment of its planner. In fact, this could be the reason why all machines eventually break down. As it is impossible to take into account the whole universe when building a machine, there are always some unknown factors which do not fit to the constructed structure of the machine.

 Consciousness in machines and brains?

Do machines have consciousness? Machines can do many things that humans do, and in many cases, even much more efficiently than humans ever could. Machines also use language, which is usually regarded as one criterion for consciousness.

In the frame of the organism-environment theory (Jarvilehto, 2000), consciousness -- in a very general sense -- means the appearance of an organisms-environment system in which every single organism-environment system acts as an element of the system as a whole, which is directed towards common results that are useful for the whole co-operative system. In such a system, it is possible to dynamically change single organism-environment systems so that they fit each other in the process of achieving the results. In this larger system, the body of the individual gets the character of a tool; it is in a similar position to any other part of the environment in as far as it can be used in the achievement of a common result. I can look at my hand in quite a similar way to how I look at the hammer in the hand; I can use both for certain purposes. Thus,  if a machine is an organism-environment system, then it includes the human being (or the human being includes the machine), and therefore it is already, from the beginning, questionable to ask if a machine can have a consciousness of its own (i.e. also in the case when no human beings exist).

But can't the machines communicate?! It seems that we may have, for example, robots which can send messages to each other and behave in relation to these messages. However, also this "fact" is an illusion. Machines can use language only in connection with humans. "Communicating" machines are designed for human purposes, and they will "communicate" only so far as this kind of action fulfils some human plans. If they start to do something else, then they no more communicate, but they have a malfunction. The use of language by the robots (even by complicated "learning" robots) may be compared to how a typewriter uses the language. Every key on the keyboard is able to produce a letter, but it depends on the human user as to whether such a communication makes any sense.

Two "communicating"  robots  are, in fact, parts of the society of humans that has extended its communicative abilities by these technical devices.  A  robot is part of the human being; therefore it is even odd to try to imagine its autonomous existence. Robots are not  "interested" in communication; spades are not interested in digging the earth, but they do this when they are in the human hand.  Every machine is an extension of human capabilities. Therefore, we could say that every machine is also "conscious", but only in connection with a human being, because a machine is part of his consciousness. The question of consciousness in machines is of the similar form as wondering whether my legs are conscious,  because they can bring me to the place which I want to  reach so well.

If we maintain that machines may have consciousness (or any other human property when separated from the human beings) we are making a very simple mistake: When a human being builds some device, he models his own capabilities and does this for his own purposes, to support his own actions. In the process of construction he abstracts some of his own characteristics, and by the help of technology, exaggerates them in the machine in order to achieve the desired results more efficiently. He constructs a spade, for example, in order to be more efficient in digging holes. A spade is like a hand in form, but more rigid and much more limited in its use. If we now start to wonder: is a spade "really" a hand? then we simply forget the history of its construction. And it would also be strange to use a spade as a model of hand, because with this comparison  we would learn nothing new about the hand.

From this it also follows that consciousness cannot be located in the brain either. A brain - let it consist of protoplasm or be it an artificial neurocomputing machine - cannot be conscious as such. The brain is only one organ of the body (and even anatomically difficult to define exactly; in fact, there are no means to separate the nervous system from the body).

The conceptual problems in locating consciousness in the brain  may be demonstrated with the following (thought)experiment:  Somebody opens your skull and gives you a mirror so that you may look into your own brain. If consciousness is located there then you are looking from outside (in this case the brain is certainly outside the eye) at the place in which this conscious looking should be located!

Of course, no scientist would seriously deny the importance of the brain for consciousness. The point, however, is that the brain is not the only place (and perhaps not even the most important!) to look if we want to understand what it means to be conscious. Therefore,  it is a serious conceptual confusion if we think that consciousness will be eventually "found" in the brain. The brain is an organ like the other organs of the body; there is no more "psyche" in the brain than in the heart, for example. The brain -- which can be neatly localized within the cranium only in the anatomy books -- consists of a huge number of specialized living cells which are organized together over the whole body and carry out physiological, not psychological or cognitive processes. The neurons are not interested in our philosophical problems! The fact that a change of activity (e.g. electrical change or increase in the blood flow) may be recorded from a certain part of the brain when the subject is carrying out a certain task does in no way justify the conclusion that the task is carried out by the area in question.

Thus, many neuroscientists together with their supporting philosophers are simply looking for things in the place where they can never be found, and this only because there happens to be such fancy equipment for carrying out the measurements. It is a cardinal theoretical confusion to think that in the near future we will be able to describe all the events in the brain that constitute a simple perception. This day will never come, because perception is a process which cannot be limited to the brain.

Consequently, consciousness cannot be located in any parts of the individual, in his head or  hemispheres of the brain. The localization of conscious experience in the head is based on the mistaken conception of the subject of the conscious action. The subject of consciousness is not the body, brain or a neuron, but an "I", a person that may not be defined on the basis of the structure of his brain, but rather as a point of intersection in a net of social relations. The "I" is not an entity in the same sense as a body, but a systemic relation. The thinking and conscious subject is not a piece of flesh, but a set of relations and processes in the social system. Such relations create a person who is distinct from all other personalities precisely through those specific relations. Thus, a person may be defined as a point of intersection of all social relations, the body being the spatial location of the point of intersection; the concept of person contains all those parts of the world and relations which
are important for the life process of the individual. These parts are the basis of the identity of the individual, his self. Nobody may have an identical personality or self to somebody else, because it is not possible to have the same social relations as somebody else. It is this fact that gives every individual his uniqueness. For the self, the body is an object like other parts of the environment, but with one important difference: the body is the point of reference for the self in relation to the common results; the body creates the personal aspect of social organization.

If I am conscious and this consciousness is to some extent dependent on brain processes, then the brain cannot be conscious. If I can make decisions, then the neurons cannot decide anything. Consciousness cannot be explained by looking at the properties of neurons. It may exist, because neurons have physiological properties making agency possible in a larger context. If we say that we are conscious because our prefrontal area is conscious, then we do not answer the original question, but only transfer it into another domain. When I behave consciously, my behavior is not in the neurons, but in a larger system consisting of my brain, body, and environment. If I want to walk my neurons need not have legs.

Conclusion

To sum up, the research on artificial intelligence is on a wrong path when trying to solve the problem of consciousness in the machines separated from the human beings, similarly as modern brain research is faced with an impossible task when trying to find special areas for consciousness in the brain. Such attempts may be compared to the effort of trying to find "steering" by looking only at the steering wheel of the car. This doesn't mean denial of the importance of the brain or the nervous system when consciousness is studied, or that machines could not simulate conscious acts. However, locating consciousness in the brain or in the machine leads to questions which cannot be answered, because for consciousness to exist, we need much more than the brain or the machine alone. Of course, if we remove the brain, for example,  one loses consciousness, but the same also happens if all other parts of the body, or of the total environment (with other people) are removed. On the other hand, even large parts (e.g. one hemisphere) of the brain may be dissected without any permanent loss of consciousness. The development of the nervous system was most probably important from the point of view of the advent of consciousness in the phylogeny, but this does not mean that consciousness is located in the neurons, and it can even less be present in man-made devices.

We can proceed in a scientific study of consciousness if we do not take as a starting point a common sense belief of location of psyche/consciousness in a certain organ of the body (as in the Ancient Greece), but start rather to analyze what the system consists of, in which consciousness could appear; i.e. try to define all those factors which seem to be necessary to have consciousness at all. Here we will see at once that other people are at least one very necessary condition. To be conscious means to be an "I" and this is possible only if there is also a "you". This means that consciousness may be present only in a system which consists of at least two people.

Thus, a machine or a brain, as such, may never have consciousness of their own. Machines and brains are parts of nature and nature is also a human "machine". When I look at a tree, it is not a part of pure nature, but part of human culture which may be used as a tool or material for a machine. Furthermore, when experiencing a tree as a beautiful part of nature or as something which I could use for building a house, I am using all my cultural and technological heritage. Also all "natural" beauty is the beauty of human culture.

References

Jarvilehto T (1998) The theory of the organism-environment system: I. Description of the theory. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science, 33, 321-334.

Järvilehto T (2000) The theory of the organism-environment system: IV. The problem of mental activity and consciousness. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science, 35: 35-57.